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Abstract
According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical)
physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statisti-
cal laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background,
while — as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Gru¨nbaum — ”the an-
tilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world
if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical
laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Gru¨nbaum
claims, the libertarians’ ’could have done otherwise’ does indeed find
support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be
of the sort found in the quantum theory.”
In this paper I will show that, quite the contrary, quantum me-
chanics does not save free will. For instance, the EPR experiments are
compatible with a deterministic world. They admit a deterministic lo-
cal hidden parameter description if the deterministic model is ’allowed’
to describe not only the measurement outcomes, but also the outcomes
of the ’decisions’ whether this or that measurement will be performed.
So, the derivation of the freedom of the will from quantum mechanics
is a tautology: from the assumption that the world is indeterministic
it is derived that the world cannot be deterministic.
1. To avoid a kind of ”Comedy of Errors” I should specify in a very strict
way what I mean under ”free will” and how it relates to ”indeterminism”.
However, the full analysis of these two notions would be outside the scope
of this paper. The only thing I can do is to describe that particular aspect
of the question on which we focus our attention.
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Figure 1.
Each arrow in Fig. 1 symbolizes a particular item within the problem of the
freedom of human action: how the mental states determine human actions,
how the mental state at time t is determined by the mental state at an
earlier time t0, are the brain processes deterministic or indeterministic, how
the mental states and the brain states are related, etc. Without going to
these details I would like to recall three different concepts of the freedom of
the will.
A) According to the commonsense understanding, the freedom of the will
means that someone can do what he thinks to do. This concept of
freedom is connected to the problem of relation between the acts and
mind states.
B) According to another concept, free will means the subjective feeling of
that someone’s future decision or future thought is open for himself.
In this way the freedom of the will relates to the problem of auto-
predictability of an evolving system.
These first two interpretations of free will are entirely compatible with de-
terminism:
In case A) a deterministic world even helps to feel a real correlation between
someone’s action and thoughts.
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In case B), as MacKay (1967) proved by applying Popper’s (1982) result
concerning the limitations governing auto-predictability of a deterministi-
cally evolving system, the subjective feeling of freedom is provided even if
the world were as mechanical as clockwork.
Now I offer to accept, for our purposes, Campbell’s definition of the freedom
of the will:
C) One’s action is free only if one could have acted differently under
the same circumstances. In other words, the relation between the
acts at time t and the circumstances (see Fig. 1) at time t0 is not
deterministic.
For sake of brevity I shall call this process starting with the given cir-
cumstances at time t0 and terminating with the acts at time t as ”choice
process”. Free will, as it is understood in C), is not accommodated in a
deterministic universe. In a deterministic world the choice process is also
deterministic, therefore Campbell’s freedom of the will, by definition, does
not exist.
2. Adolf Gru¨nbaum rejects Campbell’s conception of the freedom of the
will as inadequate. He argues that we would not have this libertarian kind of
freedom even if the choice process were governed by probabilistic laws. The
argument proceeds as follows.
Suppose that an individual X can act at time t in various ways denoted
by x1, x2, ...xn, given some fixed circumstances at time t0. Assume we have a
probabilistic theory describing his behavior according to which the probabil-
ities of the different acts are 0 < p (x1) , p (x2) , ...p (xn) < 1 (each probability
is different from 0 or 1, otherwise the choice process would be obviously de-
terministic). One can interpret these probabilities as relative frequencies
of the corresponding acts in two senses, either by taking a large statistical
ensemble of identical X-like individuals, or by repeating many times the
”experiment” with the same individual X under the same circumstances.
Does this probabilistic characterization of the choice process entail that an
individual choice from the possible acts at time t is not determined in advance
at time t0? Gru¨nbaum’s answer is, definitely not. Suppose a community,
he argues, which is subject to an indeterministic law according to which,
in a long run, 80 percent of the population will commit a certain kind of
crime. We can hold those members of the community who commit the crime
morally responsible for their behavior only if, as the libertarian standard
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would have it, they could have done otherwise. But, the statistical law does
not entitle us to say of an individual who commits the crime that he could
have done otherwise. To be sure, on the basis of the law we cannot tell
which particular individuals in the community will commit the crime. The
law does not specify that. But this limitation does not entail that, in the
very circumstances in which an individual commits the crime, he could have
refrained from so doing.
However, as Arthur Fine (1993) pointed out, Gru¨nbaum’s argumenta-
tion depends on whether, in principle, the probabilistic model in question
admits a deterministic hidden variable theory. And this is the case only
if the probability model is a classical Kolmogorovian one, ”but as we have
come to learn in connection with foundational studies in the quantum theory,
just such counterfactual distinctions may turn out to have unexpected and
testable consequences”, — as Fine (1993, p. 553) has rightly remarked. He
turns then to prove ”the conflict between antilibertarianism and the quan-
tum theory” by considering a typical EPR-type experiment. He concludes:
”If we assume that the quantum theory is correct in its statistical predictions
and we hold to the reasonable no action-at-a-distance condition involved in
the stated locality principle, then it follows that the statistical laws of the
quantum theory cannot be given an antilibertarian interpretation.... So, it
appears that, contrary to what Gru¨nbaum claims, the libertarians’ ’could
have done otherwise’ does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take
the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory.” (pp.
555-556)
Nonetheless, as Fine himself remarks, ”the conclusion that Gru¨nbaum
draws may turn out to be more robust than the particular argument he gives
for it ”.
3. Let us turn now to a more careful analysis of the alleged conflict between
antilibertarianism and the quantum theory. It is true that the quantum
theory could turn out to be in conflict with antilibertarianism, but — as we
will see it soon — it doesn’t.
To decide whether a probability model is classical or not one needs some-
thing more than the probabilities p (x1) , p (x2) , ...p (xn). Until we do not
consider the conjunctions of events x1, x2, ...xn, that is, the events like ”in-
dividual X executes acts xi and xj”, the probability model can be regarded
as a classical/Kolmogorovian one admitting deterministic hidden variable
theory. So, we must assume that the probabilistic model provides not only
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the probabilities p (x1) , p (x2) , ...p (xn) but also probabilities p (xi&xj) for
some conjunctions xi&xj.
And now we inquire: How should we imagine a probabilistic description
”of the sort found in the quantum theory” for the choice process?
Take a simple kind of example. Assume a nurse can offer four different
things to a baby: scrambled eggs, pudding, tomato juice and coke. Each
time she offers one kind of food together with one kind of drink.
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Figure 2: The quantum baby
The observed events are the followings:
A : The baby is eating scrambled eggs
A′ : The baby is eating pudding
B : The baby is drinking tomato juice
B′ : The baby is drinking coke
a : The nurse offers scrambled eggs
a′ : The nurse offers pudding
b : The nurse offers tomato juice
b′ : The nurse offers coke
The situation is entirely analogous with the Aspect-type Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen experiment with spin-1
2
particles.
The four detectors detect the spin-up events. The two switches are mak-
ing choice from sending the particles to the Stern-Gerlach magnets directed
into different directions. The observed events are the followings:
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A : The ”left particle has spin ’up’ into direction a” detector beeps
A′ : The ”left particle has spin ’up’ into direction a′” detector beeps
B : The ”right particle has spin ’up’ into direction b” detector beeps
B′ : The ”right particle has spin ’up’ into direction b′” detector beeps
a : The left switch selects direction a
a′ : The left switch selects direction a′
b : The right switch selects direction b
b′ : The right switch selects direction b′
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Figure 3: Aspect experiment with spin-1
2
particles
For the probabilities of these events, in case of 6 (a,a′) = 6 (a′,b) =
6 (a,b′) = 120◦ and 6 (b,a′) = 0, we have
p(A) = p(A′) = p(B) = p(B′) =
1
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p(a) = p(a′) = p(b) = p(b′) =
1
2
p(A ∧ a) = p(A) =
1
4
p(A′ ∧ a′) = p(A′) =
1
4
(1)
p(B ∧ b) = p(B) =
1
4
p(B′ ∧ b′) = p(B′) =
1
4
p(A ∧ a′) = p(A′ ∧ a) = p(B ∧ b′) = p(B′ ∧ b) = 0
p(A ∧B) = p(A ∧B′) = p(A′ ∧B′) =
3
32
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p(A′ ∧B) = 0
p(a ∧ a) = p(b ∧ b′) = 0
p(a ∧ b) = p(a ∧ b′) = p(a′ ∧ b) = p(a′ ∧ b′) =
1
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(2)
p(A ∧ b) = p(A ∧ b′) = p(A′ ∧ b) = p(A′ ∧ b′)
= p(B ∧ a) = p(B ∧ a′) = p(B′ ∧ a) = p(B′ ∧ a′) =
1
8
These statistical data agree with quantum mechanical results, in the sense
that
p(A ∧ a)
p(a)
= tr(Wˆ Aˆ) =
p(A′ ∧ a′)
p(a′)
= tr(Wˆ Aˆ′)
=
p(B ∧ b)
p(b)
= tr(Wˆ Bˆ) =
p(B′ ∧ b′)
p(b′)
= tr(Wˆ Bˆ′) =
1
2
p(A ∧B ∧ a ∧ b)
p(a ∧ b)
=
p(A ∧B)
p(a ∧ b)
= tr(Wˆ AˆBˆ)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a,b) =
3
8
p(A ∧B′ ∧ a ∧ b′)
p(a ∧ b′)
=
p(A ∧B′)
p(a ∧ b′)
= tr(Wˆ AˆBˆ′)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a,b′) =
3
8
(3)
p(A′ ∧B ∧ a′ ∧ b)
p(a′ ∧ b)
=
p(A′ ∧B)
p(a′ ∧ b)
= tr(Wˆ Aˆ′Bˆ)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a′,b) = 0
p(A′ ∧B′ ∧ a′ ∧ b′)
p(a′ ∧ b′)
=
p(A′ ∧B′)
p(a′ ∧ b′)
= tr(Wˆ Aˆ′Bˆ′)
=
1
2
sin2 6 (a′,b′) =
3
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where the outcomes are identified with the following projectors
Aˆ = Pˆspan{ψ+a⊗ψ+a,ψ+a⊗ψ−a}
Aˆ′ = Pˆ
span{ψ+a⊗ψ+a,ψ+a′⊗ψ−a′}
Bˆ = Pˆspan{ψ−b⊗ψ+b,ψ+b⊗ψ+b}
Bˆ′ = Pˆ
span{ψ−b′⊗ψ+b′ ,ψ+b′⊗ψ+b′}
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of the Hilbert space H2 ⊗ H2. The state of the system is assumed to be
represented as Wˆ = PˆΨs , where Ψs =
1√
2
(ψ+a ⊗ ψ−a − ψ−a ⊗ ψ+a).
Nothing speaks against that the probabilities in (1) and (2) describe also
the statistics of the baby’s behavior if the nurse makes choice with equal
frequencies between the two possible kinds of food and the two possible
kinds of drink.
The numbers in (3) indeed violate the Clauser-Horne inequalities. But
does it mean that the Aspect experiment as well as our baby’s behavior cannot
be accommodated in a deterministic universe, and consequently quantum
mechanics provides the existence of Campbell’s freedom of the will? Not at
all!
As it was shown in Szabo´ 1994 and Szabo´ 1995, quantum mechanics it-
self turns out to be reducible, that is, it admits a local deterministic hidden
variable theory. At least, this is proved for the EPR experiments on which
the libertarian quantum-indeterminists so often base their arguments. A
”deterministic universe” includes not only the causal determination of the
measurement outcomes, but it also includes causally deterministic decision
processes of whether this or that measurement is being performed. No mat-
ter whether these decisions are made by machines like the switches in the
Aspect experiment or by human beings, such processes must be determin-
istic in a deterministic world. So, if we ask whether the Aspect experiment
admits a deterministic (and local) hidden variable theory, we must draw into
the consideration the behavior of the switches, too (Cf. Brans 1988).
It turns out that the whole system together can be deterministic: The
probabilities in (1) and (2) form a correlation vector (see Pitowsky 1989)
p =
(
p(A)p(A′)p(B) . . . p(b)p(b′)p(A ∧A′)p(A ∧B)p(A ∧B′) . . . p(b ∧ b′)
)
=
(
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
3
32
3
32
1
4
1
8
1
8
1
8
0
3
32
0
1
4
1
8
1
8
0
1
8
1
8
1
4
0
1
8
1
8
0
1
4
0
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
0
)
(4)
which satisfies Pitowsky’s geometric condition: It is in the classical correla-
tion polytope, p ∈ C (8, Smax28 ), which is a sufficient condition for reducibil-
ity, in the sense that the probability model in question is Kolmogorovian
and admits a local deterministic hidden parameter theory (see Szabo´ 1995).
The same holds for the baby’s choice example. In an entirely determin-
istic world not only the baby’s behavior is deterministic, but the nurse’s
decision is deterministic, too. And the whole ”baby + nurse” system can be
accommodated in a deterministic world. In other words, it can be the case
that neither the nurse nor the baby has free will.
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You may not like this solution of the problem, arguing that the nurse
must have free will (as well as the switches in the Aspect experiment must
be indeterministic) by assumption. But it should be clear that in this case
the derivation of the freedom of the will from the quantum theory becomes
tautology: if there exists free will then free will exists. Although, this result
has been proved for a particular — but very important — case, one cannot
raise any objection against believing that the same holds for an arbitrary
situation in the quantum theory. And if it is so, Gru¨nbaum’s conclusion
really ”turns out to be more robust than the particular argument he gives
for it”.
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